期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：This paper is a contribution to the debate about whether regulations that ban
insurance companies from access to individuals’ genetic tests may lead in the near to
medium term future to substantial adverse selection costs. We choose the specific
possibility of widespread knowledge based on genetic testing for the so-called breast
cancer (BRCA1/2) genes. We use a data set including economic, demographic, and
relevant family background information to simulate the market for 10-year term life
insurance targeted at women aged 35 to 39. Using standard welfare economic analysis
for various information and regulatory scenarios concerning genetic test results, we find
generally only modest adverse selection costs associated with such a regulatory ban.
However, for family background groups which are at high risk for carrying one of the
BRCA1/2 genes, the efficiency cost of adverse selection may be significant especially if a
large fraction of women within such groups were to obtain genetic test results. These
results, therefore, suggest some caution in developing regulations which protect
individuals’ genetic privacy.
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