期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2005
卷号：2005
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：In this paper I provide a selective survey of the literature on the social welfare implications of
regulations that restrict insurers use of classification by personal characteristics. I refer to this
practice as regulatory adverse selection. To differentiate this survey from earlier ones, I focus on
directly addressing the question “What can canonical models of insurance tell us about policy
effects of restrictions on risk classification?” Rather than focus on efficiency properties of such
regulations, I adopt an explicit welfare function approach of the sort inspired by Harsanyi’s
(1953, 1955) veil of ignorance. This allows for an explicit tradeoff concerning the equity and
efficiency effects of regulatory adverse selection. Also, I pay more attention than do earlier
surveys to the possibility of pooling equilibria under nonexclusivity of provision and additional
considerations that specifically affect the life insurance market. I derive some explicit conditions
that determine when such regulations are either welfare enhancing or detrimental.
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