期刊名称：Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi
出版年度：2005
卷号：XXI
出版社：Dokuz Eylül Üniversitesi, İlahiyat Fakültesi
摘要：This article aims at analysing the relation of “self-restraint” with “virtue”
in respect of nature, sphere, epistemology, kind and refinement of their
opposites in the ethics of Aristotle with special reference to his
Nicomachean Ethics. Both terms designate the states of moral character
to be attained; their opposites to be avoided.
Self-restrained has evil desires, but virtuous man has not. ‘Unrestraint’ is
not used without further qualification. Unrestrained is a man who is in
relation to those things in regard to which a man can be profligate. He is
also concerned with them in a particular manner. Unrestrained has the
knowledge without exercising. So, his knowledge is not what is held to be
knowledge in the true sense, since it is dragged about by passion and it is
not exercised in actions which have to do with particular things.
Unrestraint is not strictly a vice for unrestraint acts against deliberate
choice; vice in accordance with it. Unrestrained is curable since he regrets
his error; but vicious man dos not feel remorse for he abides by his
choice. It seems that self-restraint is the condition for virtue; hence we
say that self-restrained is not a virtuous man, but vice versa.
