期刊名称：Annals of the University of Oradea : Economic Science
印刷版ISSN：1222-569X
电子版ISSN：1582-5450
出版年度：2003
卷号：XII
出版社：University of Oradea
摘要：A lot of economic problems are naturally modeled as a game of incomplete information, where
player’s payoff depends on his own action, the actions of others and some unknown economic
fundamentals.
Global games present a user-friendly face of games with incomplete information. The potential
daunting task of forming an infinite hierarchy of beliefs over the actions of all players in the game can be
given a representation in terms of beliefs (and the behaviour that they elicit) which are simple to the point
of being naïve. Global games go some way to bridging the gap between those who believe that rigorous
game theory has a role in economics (as we do) and those who insist on tractable and usable tools for
applied economic analysis.
关键词：currency crises, global games, common knowledge, coordination, multiple
equilibrium
