期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：In a discrete choice model of product di¤erentiation, the symmetric duopoly price
may be lower than, equal to, or higher than the single-product monopoly price. While
the market share e¤ect of competition encourages a .rm to charge less than the monopoly
price because a duopolist serves fewer consumers, the price sensitivity e¤ect of compe-
tition motivates a higher price when more consumer choice steepens the .rm.s demand
curve. The joint distribution of consumer values for the two conceivable products
determines the relative strength of these e¤ects, and whether presence of a symmet-
ric competitor results in a higher or lower price compared to single-product monopoly.
The analysis reveals that price-increasing competition is unexceptional from a theoret-
ical perspective.
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