期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：Most contracts that individuals enter into are not written from scratch; rather, they depend upon forms
and terms that have been successful in the past. In this paper, we study the structure of form construction
contracts published by the American Institute of Architects (AIA). We show that these contracts are an
ecient solution to the problem of procuring large, complex projects when unforeseen contingencies are
inevitable. This is achieved by carefully structuring the ex post bargaining game between the Principal and
the Agent. The optimal mechanism corresponding to the AIA construction form is consistent with decisions
of the courts in several prominent but controversial cases, and hence it provides an economic foundation for
a number of the common-law excuses from performance. Finally, the case of form contracts for construction
is an example of how markets, as opposed to private negotiations, can be used to determine ecient contract
terms.
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