期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We study an optimal weak collusion-proof auction in an environment
where a subset (or subsets) of bidders may collude not just on
their bids but also on their participation. Despite their ability to collude
on participation, informational asymmetry facing the potential colluders
can be exploited significantly to weaken their collusive power. The
second-best outcome — i.e., the noncollusive optimum — can be made
weak collusion-proof, if at least one bidder is not collusive, or there are
multiple bidding rings, or the second-best outcome involves a nontrivial
probability of the object not being sold. In case the second-best is not
weak collusion proof, we characterize an optimal weak collusion-proof
auction. This auction involves nontrivial exclusion of collusive bidders
— i.e., the object is not sold to any collusive bidder with positive probability.
关键词：Collusion on participation, subgroup collusion, multiple
bidding rings, an exclusion principle.
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