期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2006
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：Economists and sociologists disagree over markets’ potential to assume functions
typically performed by networks of personal connections, first among them the trans-
mission of information. This paper begins from a model of labor markets where social
ties are stronger between similar individuals and firms employing productive workers
prefer to rely on personal referrals than to hire on the anonymous market (Montgomery
(1991)). However, we allow workers in the market to engage in a costly action that
can signal their high productivity, and ask whether the possibility of signaling reduces
the reliance on the network. We find that the network is remarkably resilient. To
be effective signaling must fulfill two contradictory requirements: unless the signal is
extremely precise, it must be expensive or it is not informative; but it must be cheap,
or the network can undercut it.
Loading...
