期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：Motivated by the structure of WTO negotiations, we analyze a bargaining environment in which
negotiations proceed bilaterally and sequentially under the most-favored-nation (MFN) principle.
We identify backward-stealing and forward-manipulation problems that arise when governments
bargain under the MFN principle in a sequential fashion. We show that these problems impede
governments from achieving the multilateral efficiency frontier unless further rules of negotiation
are imposed. We identify the WTO nullification-or-impairment and renegotiation provisions and
its reciprocity norm as rules that are capable of providing solutions to these problems. In this way,
we suggest that WTO rules can facilitate the negotiation of efficient multilateral trade agreements
in a world in which the addition of new and economically significant countries to the world trading
system is an ongoing process.
Loading...
