期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We consider the design and implementation of international trade agreements when: (i) negotiations
are undertaken and commitments made in the presence of uncertainty about future political
pressures; (ii) governments possess private information about political pressures at the time that the
agreement is actually implemented; and (iii) negotiated commitments can be implemented only if
they are self-enforcing. We thus consider the design of self-enforcing trade agreements among
governments that acquire private information over time. In this context, we provide equilibrium
interpretations of GATT/WTO negotiations regarding upper bounds on applied tariffs and
GATT/WTO escape clauses. We also provide a novel interpretation of a feature of the WTO
Safeguard Agreement, under which escape clause actions cannot be re-imposed in an industry for
a period equal to the duration of the most recent escape clause action. We find that a dynamic usage
constraint of this kind can raise the expected welfare of negotiating governments.
Loading...
