期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2004
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：I compare welfare generated by a credit contract with individual liability
and a contract with joint liability. The problem is credit rationing caused
by limited liability and unobservable investment decisions. Joint liability induces
borrowers to monitor each other, however the lender can also monitor.
I show that wealthier borrowers may prefer riskier investments when liability
is joint, which causes the lender to offer them smaller loans than he would
if liability were individual, even if he cannot monitor the individual-liability
loan. Therefore, wealthier borrowers prefer individual-liability loans. The
result may explain why small businesses grow larger when funded with individual
rather than with joint-liability loans. Poorer borrowers may prefer
joint-liability loans, because borrowers monitor more efficiently, even when
their monitoring technology is the same as the lender’s, making joint-liability
loans cheaper.
关键词：joint liability, peer monitoring, credit rationing, group loans
Loading...
