期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2003
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：We propose a positive theory that is consistent with two important features of social security
programs around the world: (1) they redistribute income from young to old and (2) they induce
retirement. We construct a voting model that includes a “political campaign” or “debate” prior to the
election. The model incorporates “single-mindedness” of the groups that do not work: while the
workers divide their political capital between their “age concerns” and “occupational concerns”, the
retired concentrate all their political capital to support their age group. In our model, the elderly end
up getting transfers from the government (paid by the young) and distortionary labor income taxes
induce the retirement of the elderly. In addition, our model predicts that occupational groups that
work more will tend to have more political power. The opposite is true for non-occupational groups
(such as the elderly). We provide some evidence that supports these additional predictions.
关键词：Social Security, Retirement, Retirement Incentives, Single-Mindedness, Political
Theories of Social Security.
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