期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2003
卷号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：In repeated games with public monitoring, the consideration of behavior
strategies makes relevant the distinction between public and private
strategies. Recently, Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and
Sekiguchi [7] have provided examples of games with equilibrium payoffs in
private strategies which lie outside the set of Public Perfect Equilibrium
payoffs. The present paper focuses on another distinction, that between
mixed and behavior strategies. It is shown that, as far as with mixed
strategies one is concerned, the restriction to public strategies is not a restriction
at all. Our result provides a general explanation for the findings
of Kandori and Obara [5] and Mailath, Matthews and Sekiguchi [7] as
well as a general method for constructing examples of that sort.
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