期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We study the stability of social and economic networks when players are farsighted. In
particular, we examine whether the networks formed by farsighted players are different from
those formed by myopic players. We adopt Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch's Games
and Economic Behavior, forthcoming) notion of pairwise farsightedly stable set. We first
investigate in some classical models of social and economic networks whether the pairwise
farsightedly stable sets of networks coincide with the set of pairwise (myopically) stable
networks and the set of strongly efficient networks. We then provide some primitive
conditions on value functions and allocation rules so that the set of strongly efficient networks
is the unique pairwise farsightedly stable set. Under the componentwise egalitarian allocation
rule, the set of strongly efficient networks and the set of pairwise (myopically) stable
networks that are immune to coalitional deviations are the unique pairwise farsightedly stable
set if and only if the value function is top convex.
