期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：There is a wide range of economic problems involving the exchange of indivisible goods without
monetary transfers, starting from the housing market model of the seminal paper of Shapley and
Scarf [10] and including other problems like the kidney exchange or the school choice problems.
For many of these models, the classical solution is the application of an algorithm/mechanism
called Top Trading Cycles, attributed to David Gale, which satisfies good properties for the case
of strict preferences. In this paper, we propose a family of mechanisms, called Top Trading
Absorbing Sets mechanisms, that generalizes the Top Trading Cycles for the general case in
which individuals can report indifferences, and preserves all its desirable properties.
关键词：housing market, indifferences, top trading cycles, absorbing sets.
