期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper examines optimal redistribution in a model with high and low-skilled individuals with
heterogeneous tastes for labor, that either work or not. With such double heterogeneity, traditional
Welfarist criteria including Utilitarianism fail to take the compensation-responsibility trade-off
into account. As a response, several other criteria have been proposed in the literature. This paper
is the first to compare the extent to which optimal policies based on different normative criteria
obey the principles of compensation (for differential skills) and responsibility (for preferences for
labor), when labor supply is along the extensive margin. The criteria from the social choice
literature perform better in this regard than the traditional criteria, both in first and second best.
More importantly, these equality of opportunity criteria push the second best policy away from an
Earned Income Tax Credit and in the direction of a Negative Income tax.
关键词：optimal income taxation, equality of opportunity, heterogeneous preferences for labor.
