期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Curb sets [Basu and Weibull, Econ. Letters 36 (1991), 141-146] are product sets of pure strategies
containing all individual best-responses against beliefs restricted to the recommendations to the remaining
players. The concept of minimal curb sets is a set-theoretic coarsening of the notion of strict Nash
equilibrium. We introduce the concept of minimal strong curb sets which is a set-theoretic coarsening of the
notion of strong Nash equilibrium. Strong curb sets are product sets of pure strategies such that each
player's set of recommended strategies must contain all coalitional best-responses of each coalition to
whatever belief each coalition member may have that is consistent with the recommendations to the other
players. Minimal strong curb sets are shown to exist and are compared with other well known solution
concepts. We also provide a dynamic learning process leading the players to playing strategies from a
minimal strong curb set.
