期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In a setting of R&D co-opetition we study, by using an all-pay auction approach, how
collaboration affects strategic decisions during a patent contest, and how the latter influences the
possible collaboration network structures the firms can hope to form. The all pay auction
approach allows us to 1) endogenize both network formation and R&D intensities and 2) take
heterogeneous and private valuations for patents into account. We find that, different from
previous literature, the complete network is not always the only pairwise stable network, even and
especially if the benefits from cooperating are important. Interestingly, the other possible stable
networks all have the realistic property that some firms decide not to participate in the contest.
Thus, weak cooperation through network formation can serve as a barrier to entry on the market
for innovation. We further show that there need not be any network that survives a well known
refinement of pairwise stability, strong stability, which imposes networks to be immune to
coalitional deviations.
