期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：In this paper we argue that if the cross-country heterogeneity in productivity is
more important than the heterogeneity in government quality, it can be optimal to
give more foreign aid to more corrupt countries. We build a multi-country model
of optimal aid in which we disentangle the correlation between aid and equilibrium
corruption into two components: the first one reflects variations in the quality of
institutions and the second encompasses variations in productivity levels. The data
suggest that both components of the correlation are significant, however the effect
of variations in productivity levels is stronger. This implies that most corrupt countries,
since they are also the poorest, receive higher amounts of foreign aid.
关键词：Corruption, Aid, Government spending, Institutions.
