期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2009
卷号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Abstract
We study the optimal taxation problem in an economy composed of two-person households (men
and women), where agents influence their own old-age dependency prospects through health
spending. It is shown that the utilitarian social optimum can be decentralized by means of lump
sum transfers from men to women, because women exhibit a higher disability-free life expectancy
than men for a given level of health spending. Once self-oriented concerns for coexistence are
introduced, the decentralization of the first-best requires also gender-specific subsidies on health
spending aimed at internalizing the effect of each agent's health on the spouse's welfare. In the
presence of singles in the population, the optimal policy requires also a differentiated
subsidization of health spending for singles and couples. Finally, under imperfect observability of
couples, the incentive compatibility constraints reinforce the need for subsidization of health
spendings.
关键词：long term care, optimal taxation, preventive health spending, gender differentials,
old age dependency.
