期刊名称：Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge / Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut, Universität Köln
印刷版ISSN：0945-490X
出版年度：2007
卷号：2007
出版社：Universität Köln
摘要：In this paper, we consider optimal tax enforcement policy in the presence of pro.t
shifting towards tax havens. We show that, under separate accounting, tax enforce-
ment levels may be too high due to negative .scal externalities. In contrast, under
formula apportionment, tax enforcement is likely to be too low due to positive ex-
ternalities of tax enforcement. Our results challenge recent contributions arguing
that, under formula apportionment, there is a tendency towards ine¢ ciently high
levels of (e¤ective) tax rates.
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