期刊名称:The Journal of International Trade and Diplomacy
印刷版ISSN:1306-1542
出版年度:2009
卷号:3
期号:1
出版社:Ankara
摘要:This paper is concerned with reform of the multilateral trading system. It
does not deal with proposals for reform, though that might be the next
logical step. Rather, the paper asks “what factors preclude us from
thinking about a dramatically different system of trade regulation that
would produce better outcomes for all participants but which instead
concentrates our minds on tinkering with the existing system?”. The
paper rests on two interrelated claims and a contention. The first claim is
that in the absence of a fundamental overhaul of future trade
negotiations it is unlikely to produce outcomes that are markedly
different from those of previous rounds or that which is likely to result
from the Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The second claim is that
when confronted with yet another asymmetrical bargain, as DDA is likely
to produce, attention will most likely turn to fettling (shaping), but
nevertheless preserving, the way in which the current system works
rather than substantially changing or overhauling it. The contention is
that because our energies will tend only towards piecemeal reform, it is
likely that trade negotiations will continue to result in an exchange of
concessions that will be of relatively greater value to the economically
more significant trading nations than their developing counterparts. This
will, in turn, further exacerbate, rather than attenuate, the relative gap
between rich and poor countries (as well as elongating the range of
countries inhabiting the in-between). In making these claims I am not ruling out the prospect that reforms of some value may result in the near
future. Simply, that in the absence of a fundamental departure from
existing ways of regulating multilateral trade, few prospects exist for the
realization of development gains for all (and particularly for the least
developed). Anything less will merely patch up a problematic system.