摘要：This paper studies price competition between two ¯rms and tax
competition between two governments by using a spatial model
under the assumption of imperfect competition. With cross-
border shopping, consumers try to take advantage of price or
tax di®erentials and each government which maximizes the tax
revenue on the basis of Leviathan model may attempt to induce
cross-border shoppers into its own country by lowering its own
tax rate than the competitors. In this Nash noncooperative game,
there exists symmetric or asymmetric Nash equilibrium which de-
pends on cost structures. In particular, tax di®erential between
governments implies `asymmetric Nash equilibrium' in a noncoop-
erative game. In our model, assuming imperfect competition and
in particular, considering the case of di®erent production costs, it
is shown that tax di®erential stems from the di®erence in costs
between two ¯rms. This di®erence in tax rates induced by cost
di®erential provides a major incentive not only for consumers to
engage in cross-border shopping but also for governments to com-
pete in taxes noncooperatively.
关键词：Cross-border shopping; Tax competition; Imperfect
competition; Noncooperative game
