摘要：In an era of political pressure to reduce taxes while increasing
government services, local officials face difficult choices regarding what
services to provide and how to finance them. One outcropping of this dilemma
is that local citizens are expressing concerns that commuters use
local government services but without paying for them. In response,
some communities are considering taxing commuters. In this study we
develop a basic model of congestion in a two-city model to examine
commuters¡¯ effects on the optimal provision of public goods. The theoretical
result suggests that taxing commuters at the difference in marginal
congestion costs between the two cities can attain market equilibrium.
We then specify an empirical model to determine this tax¡¯s size for
Pennsylvania municipalities. The econometric results show differences in
marginal congestion costs between workplace and resident communities,
providing evidence that commuters may free-ride. The difference in
marginal congestion costs, however, tends to be small, so we advise policymakers
to be hesitant in adopting such a tax.
