期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2005
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：Cross-country evidence on sub-central governments’ responses to cuts in grants received
from central government shows the typical response is to adjust expenditure rather than
offset cuts by raising ‘own’ revenues. Spending cuts are focused on the wage bill and,
disproportionately, on capital expenditure. Even where countries have greater flexibility
to offset the centrally imposed cuts, through a high degree of expenditure
decentralisation, tax and borrowing autonomy, they tend not to exercise these powers. So,
centrally imposed cuts result in expenditure restraint at the sub-central level, but the
adjustment appears to suffer from short-termism, given the disproportionate focus on
capital spending.
