期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2003
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：In this paper we study the link between elections, fiscal policy and economic
growth/fluctuations. The set-up is a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model of
growth and endogenously chosen fiscal policy, in which two political parties can alternate
in power. The party in office chooses jointly how much to tax and how to allocate its total
expenditure between public consumption and production services. The main theoretical
prediction is that forward-looking incumbents, with uncertain prospects of re-election, find
it optimal to follow relatively shortsighted fiscal policies, and that this lowers economic
growth. The model is estimated using quarterly data for Germany, the UK and the US
from 1960 to 1999. Our econometric results provide clear support for the main theoretical
prediction. They also give plausible and significant estimates for the productivity of public
production services, the weight which households place on public consumption services
relative to private consumption and the time discount rate. Moreover, we find that changes
in electoral uncertainty produce the longest lasting fluctuations in the European economies
followed by the US.
关键词：Political uncertainty, economic growth and fluctuations, optimal policy.
