期刊名称：IWH Diskussionspapiere / Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung Halle
摘要：Even though small and mediumsized firms (SMEs) were believed not to proceed
beyond exporting in their internationalization routes, we can observe new types of co
operation intensive entrepreneurial firms – socalled “micromultinational enterprises”
(mMNEs) – entering the global landscape. These firms face the challenge to manage and
control a portfolio of national and international alliances simultaneously (ego network).
The aim of this paper is to provide game theoretically consolidated conditions in order
to analyze the effectiveness and efficiency of interorganizational sanction mechanisms
in an alliance portfolio setting. A game theoretical framework is developed over three
stages with increasing complexity. Results show that two out of six analyzed sanction
mechanisms do not fulfill the game theoretical condition for effectiveness. The efficien
cy analysis sensibilizes for discretionary elements in governance structures and demon
strates that not one single sanction mechanism but rather the right choice and combina
tion of different types of sanction mechanisms leads to efficient results. We contribute
to the international business, alliance, and network literature in several ways by focusing
on alliance portfolios held by mMNEs. In doing so, we move beyond the dyadic level
and analyze sanction mechanisms from an ego network perspective, a still widely under
emphasized topic in the literature.
关键词：alliance portfolio, ego network, governance, sanctions, game theory
