期刊名称：IoES Working Paper Series / Institute of Economic Studies, University of Iceland
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：niversity of Iceland
摘要：Purpose and approach: We examine theoretically and experimentally how unequal
abilities to contribute a
ect incentives and eciency when players compete for membership
in strati ed groups based on the contributions they make. Players have either a low or a
high endowment. Once assigned to a group based upon the contribution they have made,
players share equally in their group's collective output. Depending upon the parameters,
the mechanism has several distinct equilibria that di
er in eciency.
Findings: Our theoretical analysis indicates that as long as certain assumptions are
satis ed, eciency should increase rather than decrease the more abilities to contribute
di
er. The analysis also suggests various follow-up experiments about equilibrium se-
lection, tacit coordination, and the e
ect of unequal abilities in systems with endogenous
grouping. We conduct an experiment that shows that subjects tacitly coordinate the mech-
anism's asymmetric payo
-dominant equilibrium with precision; this precision is robust
to a change in the structure and complexity of the game.
Implications: The results suggest that people respond to merit-based grouping in a
natural way, and that competitive contribution-based grouping encourages social contri-
butions even when abilities to contribute di
er, which is the case in all communities and
societies.
关键词：Endogenous group formation; cooperation; meritocracy; mechanism de-
sign; experiment; social dilemma; game theory; policy
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