期刊名称：Economics Discussion Papers / Department of Economics, College of Management and Economics, University of Guelph
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
期号：01
出版社：University of Guelph
摘要：There is a prospect of substantial advancements in the understanding of the rela-
tionship between disease and genetics at least in the medium term to long term future.
In this paper we consider the implications on two aspects of behaviour - surveillance
to improve the chances of early detection of disease onset and preventive actions to
reduce the probability of onset - that may change as a result of the acquisition of
information from genetic tests. We argue that there are problems for both private
insurance regimes, with risk-rating allowed according to genetic type, and public in-
surance regimes (or a private insurance system with an ëe§ectiveícommunity rating
regulation) in generating potential health beneÖts from increased genetic information.
In the public regime appropriate signals to obtain genetic information are not always
provided while in the private regime premium risk can block otherwise fruitful acqui-
sitions of this information. In both regimes moral hazard considerations can blunt the
adoption of otherwise useful information with the further problem for public insurance
of possibly encouraging excessive adoption of genetic testing.
关键词：value of information, surveillance, prevention.
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