期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper addresses the issue of capital tax competition among an arbi-
trary number of countries. Countries are allowed to be asymmetric not only
in their population endowment but also in their capital endowment per in-
habitant. National governments tax capital and labor in order to finance a
public good. Asymmetric capital taxation arises at equilibrium leading to
a distortion on the international capital market. We provide conditions for
the existence of a Nash Equilibrium. We fully characterize how equilibrium
taxes and welfare levels depend upon countries’ population and capital en-
dowments.
