期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper studies optimal earnings taxation in a three period life cycle
model where the taxes raised to finance an exogenous amount of public
expenditure are allowed to be differentiated across ages. Agents choose their
level of education when young and their age of retirement when old. We first
look at the problem of optimal taxation when the young can borrow and then
turn to the case where young face borrowing constraints. It is shown that,
without borrowing constraints, a first best optimum can be decentralized by
setting a zero tax rate in the third period and a first period tax lower than
the second one. With the borrowing constraint, the government may not be
able restore intertemporal efficiency in which case a zero tax rate when old
may not be optimal.
