期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We study Myerson’s incomplete information bargaining solution un-
der the assumption of verifiable types. For the case of an informed
principal, in which one individual has all the bargaining power, we
provide exact characterizations both from the non cooperative and
from the cooperative perspective. We then show that the axiomatic
characterization can be extended to the case in which both individu-
als have some bargaining power. Myerson’s approach also suggests a
new definition of the core that refines Wilson’s coarse core. We argue
that this refinement captures an important aspect of negotiation at
the interim stage.
