期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2002
卷号：2002
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Investments in generation capacity in restructured electricity systems remain a rel-
atively unexplored subject in the modeling community. We consider three models
that differ by their underlying economic assumptions and the degree to which they
depart from the old capacity expansion representations. The first model assumes a
perfect, competitive equilibrium. It is computationally very similar to the old ca-
pacity expansion models even if its economic interpretation is different. The second
model (open-loop Cournot game) extends the Cournot model that is sometimes used
for modeling operations in restructured electricity systems to include investments in
new generation capacities. This model can be interpreted as describing investments
in an oligopolistic market where capacity is simultaneously built and sold on long-
term contracts when there is no spot market (Power Purchase Agreements). The third
model (closed-loop Cournot game) separates the investment and sales decision. It
describes a situation where investments are decided in a first stage and sales occur in
a second stage, both taking place in oligopolistic markets. The second stage is a spot
market. This makes the problem a two-stage game and corresponds to investments in
merchant plants where the first stage equilibriumproblemis solved subject to equilib-
rium constraints. Because two-stage models are relatively unusual in discussions ofelectricity, we characterize the properties of this game and compare them with those
of the open-loop game. We show that despite some important differences, the open
and closed-loop games share many properties. One of the important results is that
the solution of the closed-loop game, when it exists, falls between the solution of the
open-loop game and the competitive equilibrium.
关键词：Electric utilities; Existence and characterization of equilibria; Non
cooperative games; Programming; Oligopolistic Models
