期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：The lobbying process is modelled as an auction with externalities
in which lobbies bid to get implemented their most-preferred policy.
Furthermore, the government may influence the lobbying process it-
self by biasing the auction among organized interests. We identify the
following trade-off: competition yields a higher transfer to the govern-
ment, but the outcome of the game tends to be less efficient than what
it is when lobbies negotiate. We extend and illustrate the model by
means of a public good game involving several regions. Lobbying by
regions may yield a quantity of public good that may vastly differ from
that chosen by a majority of regions. This is so when the regions with
the highest financing shares lie at the extremes of the distribution.
