期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In this paper we derive the equilibrium level of redistribution
from one mobile factor (say, the rich or capital) to another possibly mobile
factor (say, the poor or labour) when regions choose both their inter-regional
transfers and redistributive policies non-cooperatively. We find that inter-
regional transfers are always desirable (to mitigate the fiscal competition),
but cannot be sustained (as a Nash equilibrium) when chosen simultane-
oulsy with the redistributive policy. On the other hand if regions can pre-
commit to inter-regional transfers before setting their redistributive policy,
the strategic effect of inter-regional transfers makes them sustainable. How-
ever there are also equilibria with partial or no inter-regional transfers at
all. The effects of regional asymmetries are analyzed. Interestingly enough,
evidence suggests that predictions of our model accord very closely with the
pattern of transfers in the EU across member states.
