期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Regions can benefit by offering infrastructure services that are dif-
ferentiated. Competiton between regions over potential investors is
then less direct, allowing them to realize greater benefits from exter-
nal investors. The two polar cases of full and incomplete information
about investors’ needs are studied. In both cases, there is regional dif-
ferentiation. However, fiscal competition is efficient in the former case
but not in the latter. Finally, it is shown that free entry in the location
market calls for some regulation because of the excessive number of
competing regions that would prevail in equilibrium.
