期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper analyses how the way emission permits are traded —their market
microstructure— impacts the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency.
The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many
financial markets : market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by set-
ting a ask price and a bid price. The possibility of permit banking is also introduced
in our dynamic two-period model.
We show that when the market makers and the agency do not know the technology
of the producers with certainty, a positive spread may be set by market makers and
that, under some conditions, banking increases the expected welfare given this market
microstructure.
If such a microstructure takes place or is organised on markets for pollution permits,
we recommend to allow for banking (a) if the marginal willingness to pay for the en-
vironment increases much over time, (b) if the pollutant is rather a stock than a flow
one, and/or (c) if the incomplete information faced by the intermediaries and by the
agency is severe. In the first period, the environmental agency will then have to define
andallocatealargeramountofpermitsthanifbankingisnotallowed,butaloweror
a same amount of permits in the second period.
