期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper deals with a general version of a two-stage model of R&D
and product market competition. We provide a thorough generaliza-
tion of previous results on the comparative performance of noncooper-
ative and cooperative R&D, dispensing in particular with ex-post firm
symmetry and linear demand assumptions. We also characterize the
structure of profit-maximizing R&D cartels where firms competing in
a product market jointly decide R&D expenditure, as well as internal
spillover, levels. We establish the firms would essentially always prefer
extremal spillovers, and within the context of a standard specification,
derive conditions for the optimality of minimal spillover.
关键词：oligopolistic R&D, endogenous spillovers,
research joint ventures, R&D cartel
