期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2001
卷号：2001
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper analyses the political support for a social insurance
that includes elements of redistribution when there exists an imperfect pri-
vate insurance alternative. Individuals differ both in their income and risk.
The social insurance is compulsory and charges an income-related contribu-
tion with pooling of risks. The private insurance is voluntary and charges
a contribution based on individual risks. However due to the adverse selec-
tion problem, private insurance companies provide only partial insurance.
Adopting a non-expected utility model, we show that there is a general ma-
jority support for social insurance and that this support is increasing with
risk aversion. We also show that a mixed insurance is politically impossible,
regardless of the degree of redistribution of social insurance and the joint
distribution of risk and income in the population. Lastly, we analyse how
the political support for social insurance is affected by any change in its
redistributive component and the possibility of using genetic tests
关键词：majority rule, social insurance, redistribution, adverse selection.
