期刊名称：Discussion Paper Series / Department of Economics, New York University
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：New York University
摘要：In current debates regarding the future of education, teacher compensation schemes are often
criticized for their lack of performance-based pay. Proponents of merit pay for teachers argue
that tying teacher salaries to student achievement will induce teachers to focus on the success of
their students and stimulate innovation in the school system as a whole. In this paper, we use a
randomized policy experiment conducted in the New York City public school system to explore
the effects of one group-based pay scheme. We investigate potential impacts of incentive pay
over two academic years (2007-2008 and 2008-2009) on student performance on annual math
and reading exams, teacher absences, and responses to environmental surveys of teachers and
students. We also consider whether the program had differential outcomes on groups within
schools that were especially likely to be targeted, given the particular incentive structure of the
program. Last, we explore relative impacts on the market for teachers by examining end-of-year
teacher turnover and the quality composition of newly hired teachers. In general, we find no
significant effects of this program. However, there is some evidence that the program reduced
teacher absenteeism in schools with a small number of teachers, and that these effects were
weakened in larger schools by the presence of free-riding.
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