期刊名称：Dresden Discussion Paper Series in Economics / Dresden University of Technology, Faculty of Business Management and Economics
印刷版ISSN：0945-4829
出版年度：2003
卷号：1
出版社：Dresden
摘要：Many negotiations offer a potential for integrative agreements in which the parties can maximize joint gains (through
logrolling) without competing for resources as in a 0-sum game; nevertheless negotiators often fail to exploit this
potential and settle for suboptimal, distributive agreements. In this study a situation of two-issues bilateral negotiation
has been considered. Our aim is to get some insight on the causes that prevent negotiators from reaching integrative,
Pareto-optimal agreements. We ran two experiments (one with policy makers and one with students) in which we tested
the “fixed pie bias” of negotiators, and we introduced a new explanation for suboptimality, based on the hypothesis of a
satisficing (not optimizing) behavior of negotiators, which leads them to a “zone of agreement bias”(ZAB).
