期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2000
卷号：2000
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：In a game with rational expectations individuals refine their informa-
tion with the information revealed by the strategies of other individ-
uals: their elementary acts of other individuals at each state of the
world. At a Nash of a game with rational expectations, the informa-
tion of individuals is essentially symmetric: the same profile is also
an equilibrium of a game with symmetric information; and their acts
are common knowledge. If each player has a veto act, which yields a
minimum payoff that no other profile of strategies attains, then the
veto profile is the only Nash equilibrium, and it is an equilibrium with
rational expectations and essentially symmetric information; which ac-
counts for the impossibility of speculation.
关键词：Nash equilibrium, rational expectations, common knowl-
edge.
