期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2000
卷号：2000
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：We analyze a model of network formation where the costs of form-
ing links are publicly known but an individual's bene ts are not known
to the social planner. The objective is to design a mechanism which
not only ensures that an ecient network always forms in equilibrium
but also ensures that the resulting net payo
s to the agents are eq-
uitable. We propose two mechanisms towards this end; in the rst,
agents announce sequentially the set of players with whom they wish
to form links and a cost contribution. We show that all subgame perfect
equilibria of this game result in the formation of an ecient network
but the resulting net payo
s are asymmetric. The second mechanism
corrects this asymmetry through a two-stage variant of the rst mech-
anism. We also discuss an extension of the basic model to cover the
case of directed graphs and give conditions under which the proposed
mechanisms are immune to deviations by coalitions.
