期刊名称：Discussion Papers / Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration
印刷版ISSN：0804-6824
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
出版社：Bergen
摘要：In this paper we compare the proÖtability of a merger to the proÖtabil-
ity of a partial ownership arrangement and Önd that partial ownership arrangements
can be more proÖtable for the acquiring and acquired Örm because they can result
in a greater dampening of competition. We also derive comparative statics on the
prices of the acquiring Örm, the acquired Örm, and the outside Örms. In a dual
context, we show that a cross-majority owner may have incentives to sell a fraction
of the shares in one of the Örms he controls to a silent investor who is outside the
industry. Aggregate ex post operating proÖt in the two Örms controlled by the cross-
majority shareholder then increases, such that both the cross-majority shareholder
and the silent investor will be better o§ with than without the partial divestiture
关键词：Media economics, Mergers, Corporate Control, Financial Control
