期刊名称：Finanzwissenschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge / Finanzwissenschaftliches Forschungsinstitut, Universität Köln
印刷版ISSN：0945-490X
出版年度：2009
卷号：2009
出版社：Universität Köln
摘要：Does increasing transparency improve .scal policy behavior of local governments?
One way this could take place is via Yardstick Competition between incumbents of
neighboring municipalities. This paper contributes to the literature by introducing
a simple model which employs probabilistic voting to show the e¤ect of Yardstick
Competition on the amount of political rents diverted from the tax revenue. Since
additional rents lower the probability of being reelected, the incumbent will reduce
equilibrium rents if voters use information on .scal performance in similar munici-
palities to evaluate the incumbent.s quality. I test this hypothesis on a panel dataset
of municipal budget and electoral data in the german state of Northrine-Westphalia.
I show evidence for Yardstick Competition in the local business and property tax
rates.
关键词：transparency, local public .nance, political economics,
spatial econometrics
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