期刊名称：Discussion Paper / Département des Sciences Économiques de l'Université Catholique de Louvain
印刷版ISSN：1379-244X
出版年度：2010
卷号：1
出版社：Université catholique de Louvain
摘要：This paper presents a strategic growth model that analyzes the impact
of endogenous preferences on equilibrium dynamics by employing the tools
provided by lattice theory and supermodular games. Supermodular game
structure of the model let us provide monotonicity results on the greatest
and the least equilibrium without making any assumptions regarding
the curvature of the production function. We also sharpen these results
by showing the differentiability of the value function and the uniqueness
of the best response correspondence almost everywhere. We show that,
unlike globally monotone capital sequences obtained under corresponding
optimal growth models, a non-monotonic capital sequence can be obtained.
We conclude that the rich can help the poor avoid poverty trap
whereas even under convex technology, the poor may theoretically push
the rich to her lower steady state.
关键词：Lattice programming, Endogenous time preference
