期刊名称:Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度:2001
卷号:1
出版社:University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要:The paper analyzes the e
ects of a regionally coordinated prot tax in a model
with three active countries, one of which is not part of the union, and a globally
mobile rm. We show that regional tax coordination can lead to two types of welfare
gains. First, for investments that would take place in the region in the absence of
coordination, this measure can transfer location rents from the rm to the union.
Second, by internalizing all of the union's benets from foreign direct investment,
a coordinated policy attracts more investment than when member states act in
isolation. Consequently, tax levels may rise or fall under regional coordination.
关键词:tax competition, regional coordination, international investment