期刊名称：Departmental Discussion Papers / University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
出版年度：2001
卷号：1
出版社：University of Glasgow, Department of Economics
摘要：It is often argued that multi-issue committees should discuss issues simultaneously
to avoid inefficiency. However, in practice, parties can be constrained to discuss
issues sequentially and in this case, existing game-theoretical models give inconclusive
results: either parties have different preferences over agendas or they are indifferent.
We show that when there is an important issue, parties have the same preferences over
agendas, in particular they prefer to discuss the most important issue Þrst. Moreover,
when an issue is difficult/urgent (in the sense that the rejection of a proposal on this
issue implies a game breakdown with a positive probability) parties prefer to postpone
the negotiations over the difficult/urgent issue. We highlight several incentives that
players need to take into account in forming their preferences over agendas. Since
these are often in conßict, the existence of a Pareto optimal agenda is of particular
interest
