期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：Abstract
This paper discusses the effects of pressure policies on offshore financial centers as well as their
ability to enforce the compliance of those centers with anti-money laundering regulations.
Offshore banks can be encouraged to comply with rigorous monitoring of an investor's identity
and the origin of his/her funds when pressure creates a sufficiently high risk of reputational harm
to the investor. We show that such pressure policies harm both offshore and onshore investors and
can benefit both the bank industry and tax administrations. We show that social optimal pressure
policies are dichotomous decisions between no pressure at all and a pressure great enough to
persuade offshore banks to comply. The delegation of pressure policies to onshore tax institutions
may be inefficient. Deeper financial integration fosters compliance by the offshore center.
