期刊名称：CORE Discussion Papers / Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
出版年度：2010
卷号：2010
期号：1
出版社：Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (UCL), Louvain
摘要：This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic
individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects
pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise
to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the
heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of
pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their
“myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are
made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal
with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to “habit
formation” and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic
individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption,
which complicates public policy.
关键词：myopia, dual self, pensions, sin goods, habit formation.
